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Abstract. This study examines the impact of military connection and politically connection on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure. 
Using 110 firm year observations of Indonesia listed firms, we predict that the presence of military or politically connection in firm’s board 
will increase the Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure level on its Sustainability Report. We found that military connected boards 
increase the Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure while politically connection does not show any correlation. Our further analysis on 
specific type of each connection shows that military career position, army military origin, marine military origin, People’s Consultative 
Assembly politically affiliation and House of Representation politically affiliation increase the level of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure level. Our result is robust due to various research model and Heckman’s two stage regression. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For a long time, the military has been viewed as developing value systems and beliefs in its veterans and their 
potentially great value in corporate business (Elder, 1986; Elder & Clipp, 1989; Groysberg, Hill, & Johnson, 
2010).  Through its influence, a military connection has been of considerable interest in business research topics. 
This paper adds to the literature by examining the military connection influence towards Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD). 
 
Various studies have examined the influence of military connections towards corporate outcomes. Using 1,115 
CEOs with military connection of US Firms, Benmelech and Frydman (2015) found that military-connected 
CEOs tend to have lower investment and RnD expenses and their firm is less likely to involve in fraud. They also 
found that military-connected CEOs performed better in industry distress times. Harymawan (2018) found that 
military-connected firms are statistically proven to have a lower interest rate of loan in Indonesian firms.  In order 
to deal with endogeneity problems, Heckman’s two-stage procedures are used in Harymawan’s (2018) research. 
Military experienced CEOs also show has higher announcement-period of abnormal stock returns during 
corporate acquisition (Lin, et al., 2011). They also document poor corporate governance and acquisition 
outcomes’ negative correlation is weakened by military-connected CEOs presence. 
 
The military connection also shows some implications on corporate tax avoidance. Based on an assumption 
whereby CEOs who have greater respect for rules will avoid less tax, Law andMills (2013) found that those CEOs 
which represented as ex-military personnel will lead towards lower corporate tax avoidance, both in cash and 
GAAP effective tax rate. Further, they researched the detail on CEOs military experiences correlation with tax 
avoidance by moderating it according to his/her military service length, military academy attendance and having 
served during World War II, Korean War and Vietnam War (Law & Mills, 2014). In the latest literature, using a 
new econometric technique that disentangles manager effects from firm effects, Law and Mills (2017) found 
CEOs with military experiences maintain lower reserves for unrecognized tax benefits. 
 
Prior literature provides lights on the debate regarding the benefits of hiring a corporate board that has a military-
connection (Benmelech & Frydman, 2015; Duffy, 2006; Lin, et al., 2011; Mietzner & Misol, 2012; Rieffel & 
Pramodhawardani, 2007). However, to the as researchers’ knowledge, there are no studies that specifically 
examine the military connection on Corporate Social Responsibly Disclosure (CSRD). Therefore, we focus on 
examining the correlation of military-connected firms on CSRD to provide additional knowledge of military-
connected board benefits on the firm.  
 
All samples consisted of Indonesian listed companies, a developing nation where its government has lack of 
transparency and is inefficient (Leuz, et al., 2003; Porta, et al., 1997), which provides additional opportunity to 
establish a strong mutual business relationship (Harymawan, 2018). It indicates that political connection is also an 
important variable to provide a robust result as we examine the correlation of military connection towards CSRD, 
as political connection shares some similar characteristics with a military connection in terms of the mutual 
business relationship in developing countries. Prior studies results show that political connection is shown to have 
a positive correlation with CSRD (Abd Rahman & Ku Ismail, 2016; Huang & Zhao, 2016). This correlation is 
based on political rent extraction (McChesney, 1987), where corporates with a politically-connected board are 
paid in the form of CSRD to meet government needs as they accept preferential policies from the government.  
 
For our empirical tests, we employ univariate and multivariate analysis to test the hypotheses. Financial firms are 
excluded from the sample. Our final sample consists of 110 observations from the 2013-2017 period. We also 
provide additional analysis which is examining several military connections and political connection types to 
further highlight the relationship between military connection to CSRD. Lastly, we conduct Heckman’s two-stage 
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regression to deal with the endogeneity problem of military connection with its instrumental variable, which is a 
military base distance to a firm’s headquarter office. 
 
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that military connections are positively and 
significantly correlated with CSRD. This indicates that firms with rules concerning boards which represented a 
military connection provide more CSRD. This is because military personnel have a high concern about humanity 
as they are commonly dispatched to natural disaster sites. We also found that R2 coefficient increases if the 
military connection is included in the research model. Second, we find that there is no relationship between 
politically-connected firms and CSRD. One of the possible reasons is the tendency of politically-connected firms 
to protect the benefits acquired from the political connection (Chaney, et al., 2011), including CSRD.  
 
Additional analysis of specific military and political connection types shows an interesting result. We document 
that higher military position, army military origin, and marine military origin have a positive significant 
correlation with CSRD, while, on the other hand, police origin has a negative correlation. This result derives from 
including Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Agency) in police origin, wherein most of their 
operations are classified so their work nature is carried over into a firm’s disclosure level, including CSRD. As for 
specific political connection types, we found that People’s Consultative Assembly (PCA) and House of 
Representatives (HOR) affiliation has a positive correlation with CSRD. The underlying reason behind the result 
is that both PCA and HOR are Indonesian government bodies entitled to devise national regulations, including 
regulation related to CSR activities or its disclosure. Our Heckman’s two-stage regression result provides 
additional empirically robust evidence of correlation of military connection and CSRD. 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the result of this study shows the advantages 
enjoyed by military-connected firms in developing countries (Harymawan, 2018; Mietzner & Misol, 2012). To 
our knowledge, this study is the first empirical study to provide the effect of military experience director with a 
focus on CSRD in Indonesia. Second, this study complements the prior studies in the CSRD (e.g. Cheng, et al., 
2014; El Ghoul, et al., 2011; Saeidi, et al., 2015) by providing evidence on the factors that might affect the level 
of CSRD in developing countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a background for the study and this is followed 
by the hypotheses development section. Section III describes our sample and research model. Section IV reports 
our main empirical results. Section V concludes.  
 
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1. Board Connections Charateristic in Indonesia         
    
Developing countries (Malaysia, South Africa, Pakistan, Libya, Turkey, etc.), including Indonesia, have provided 
certain advantages towards firms which select a board that has certain connections (Abd Rahman & Ku Ismail, 
2016; Fung, et al., 2015; Funnel, 2005; Habib, et al., 2017; Harymawan, 2018; Shah, 2014. This results from 
Indonesia not having strict and detailed regulation on specific board connection characteristics.  As long as it does 
not violate the laws and provides certain benefits, firms will keep considering hiring board(s) that have military 
and/or political connections. 
 
Military forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) were a dominant player in the economy during the strongman 
era of President Soeharto, a former general, gaining favored access to contracts and controlling nationalized 
companies.  This phenomenon can be proven to be true as there has always been at least one presidential 
candidate that has applied in a presidential election since 2004.  Thus, we can conclude that Indonesia is a country 
with an enormous influence of the military over the political decision-making process (Harymawan, 2018).  
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After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has demonstrated significant progress in the context of the first generation of 
military reforms, which is closely related with institutional changes in the government security sector (Mietzner, 
2009). According to Cottey, et al. (2001), “the first generation” is the important stage where disassembling old 
power structures and, at the same time, also the definition of what the final goal of the democratic transition 
should be. Large extraction has been happening in the military from formal politics and business and has 
developed a new system in legislation in order to overview and control the military. But Indonesia is still trapped 
and cannot fully enter the second generation of military reform, which is completing the framework that was 
developed in the first: it provides the democratic substance to the structures established by laws and political 
decisions (Mietzner, 2009). 
 
In mid-2005, Indonesia established the TNI Business Transformation Management Agency with a primary 
objective to clean up military business from the Suharto legacy (Vestergaard, 2006), and we documented several 
examples of businesses that had a major military player involved.  A large number of military were involved in 
business in Indonesia due to the Indonesia military forces raising money outside the government budget by 
spreading the business network.  Such business is not directly controlled by the military’s central command, but 
they have been allowed to spread so as to overcome the budget constraints (Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
 
Undoubtedly, the military has a major influence on Indonesian business, as both parties enjoy mutual benefits. It 
provides unique institutional settings to examine the relationship between military connection and business 
activities in Indonesia.  Especially the corporate action that relates to certain military traits such as empathy to 
social situations. 
 
In accordance with a military connection, the political connection is also widely spread in Indonesian business. 
Indonesia’s political party funding system = is basically from three sources - internal (member contributions), 
state-grant, and external (Mietzner, 2015). The central level of a political party needs approximately 50 billion 
Rupiahs ($26 million) funding annually while both member donations and state donations each only 0.6 billion 
Rupiahs (Faisal, et al., 2018). Thus, it means politics is highly involved in the business as its main source of funds 
comes from the private sector. On the other side, a business can provide easiness related to specific regulations as 
its token of gratitude.  
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
 
Military personnel have the impression that they are powerful and disciplined figure that can hopefully give 
influence in the form of positive corporate actions. Military-connected CEOs can influence executives’ decisions, 
corporate policy, corporate outcomes and tend not to be involved in fraud (Benmelech & Frydman, 2015). 
According to Lin, Ma, Officer, and Zou (2011), a military-connected CEO can influence the firm value by 
lowering the agency cost in the context of acquisition and earn a good acquisition.  
 
Another trait that becomes a main advantages of using ex-military personnel is leadership. Multi-national 
companies such as Wal-Mart and General Electric are craving leadership talent. Those companies have for some 
years been recruiting junior military officers that served in Iraq and Afghanistan (O'Keefe, 2010). A major player 
in business needs a CEO that has already proven they can manage a fiercely competitive business environment 
and, among all candidates’ background, military experiences may well suit best for this requirement (Duffy, 
2006). Firms should be interested in appointing directors who possess not only superior decision-making skills 
under pressure, but who also may be inclined to behave more ethically to prevent future breaches of stakeholder 
trust (Simpson & Sariol, 2018). Somehow military personnel have been viewed as a great leader as they have 
already experienced hard times and rallied the morale of their comrades. Military officers are used to managing 
the psychology of his/her subordinates to accomplish their duty effectively and efficiently.  
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Military personnel have been acknowledged as having a strong relationship with leadership. General Eric K. 
Shinseki, Chief of Staff of The Army states: “We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what 
makes us different”.  The military is often stereotyped as a monolithic society and that everything inside the 
military is homogeneous. Military forces tend to have a diverse collection, such as organizations, roles, cultures, 
and people (Wong, et al., 2003). For example, in Indonesia, the military is divided into three professions: 
Angkatan Darat (Army), Angkatan Laut (Marine), and Angkatan Udara (Airforce). Each profession has own 
uniqueness and culture, and, as a result, its own unique aspect of leadership. 
 
Military personnel are also known as parties used to being the first backup to help causalities when there is a 
disaster. As military personnel are often to be dispatched as soon as possible to a disaster location, it’s possible to 
foster military personnel sensitivity towards society conditions through various humanity actions which are 
closely related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
 
Oh, Bae, & Kim (2017) claim that sinful firms which including firearms and military industries tend to neutralize 
their negative image by intensifying advertising of their CSR activities. According to them, sinful firms tend to 
increase advertising efforts when they engage in CSR comparing to non-sinful firms. It can be hint for 
management of military industries who also mostly military veterans are used to view CSR as important variable 
to maintain firms’ image. 
 
The combined traits that we previously mentioned will ensure military personnel will encourage the other 
management to follow his/her opinion, resulting in companies having tendencies to pay more attention to their 
CSR activities. Those CSR activities will be documented in the company’s Sustainability Report (SR) and, as a 
result, military-connected companies indicate their CSE as one of the important corporate actions that needs to be 
done. For all those reasons we devise the first hypothesis as follow: 
 
H1: Military-Connected Board is positively related to CSRD 
 
Political connections allow a company to be able to increase economic benefits and some companies have a more 
pointed political background to the Board of Directors due to the experience, insight, and ability with regard to 
the government (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). A Board of Directors which has experience with regards to the 
government, considers that CSR can improve the performance of the company. According to Huang and Zhao 
(2016), political connections can be a positive correlation against the CSR performance of private companies 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange for the period 2008-2014. In addition, political connections are considered 
capable of giving advantages to improve the company's performance (Bencheikh, et al., 2017) and also increase 
the value of the company (Faccio, 2006). Therefore, the second hypothesis in this research is as follows:   
 
H2: Politically-connected Board is positively related to CSRD 
 
3. Sample and Research Model 
 
3.1. Sample and Data 
 
We initially obtained from the Sustainability Disclosure Database a sample of 244 firm-year observations from 
Indonesia over the period 2013-2017 from the GRI database. To test our hypotheses, we exclude (1) firms that not 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange; (2) firms that do not issue a sustainability report; (3) firms included in 
financial industries (SIC 6). The final sample consists of 110 firm-year observation with 33 firms.  
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Our final data are described in Table I. Table I is comprised of firms’ distribution by its connection. As shown in 
Panel A, we found that 28 firm-year observations (22 percent) from all our sample are of a military-connected 
firm. It means that, in only less than one-fourth of companies, one or more company board(s) has military 
experience. This result is consistent with other military connection research (Benmelech & Frydman, 2015; 
Harymawan, 2018; Law & Mills, 2017; Lin, et al., 2011) that military personnel and activities tend to be less 
certain in listed companies. This phenomenon is highlighted as a result of military-connected companies tending 
to be less transparent in order to avoid public monitoring (Misol, 2006). We also documented that, among all 
industry types based on US SIC only wholesale and trade industry (SIC 5), military-connected companies firm-
year observations are higher than companies than do not have any military connection. 
 
Table 1. Sample Distribution based on Industry Classification  
 
Panel A. Military Connection Sample Distribution (MCON) 
Industry (SIC) 
MCON NON-MCON Total 
N % N % N % 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing (0) 
0 0 10 100 10 100 
Mining and Construction (1) 12 34 23 66 35 100 
Manufacturing (2) 6 40 9 60 15 100 
Manufacturing (3) 2 12 15 88 17 100 
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary service (4) 
1 5 19 95 20 100 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
(5) 
7 78 2 22 9 100 
Services (8) 0 0 4 100 4 100 
Total 28 25 82 76 110 100 
Panel B. Political Connection Distribution Sample (PCON) 
Industry (SIC) 
PCON NON-PCON Total 
N % N % N % 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing (0) 
7 70 3 30 10 100 
Mining and Construction (1) 27 63 8 37 35 100 
Manufacturing (2) 10 80 5 20 15 100 
Manufacturing (3) 9 41 8 59 17 100 
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary service (4) 
16 75 4 25 20 100 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (5) 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Services (8) 2 50 2 50 4 100 
Total 73 66 37 34 110 100 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
Unlike military connection, politically-connected companies have likely shown their presence in listed 
companies, as shown in panel B. According to our sample, there is 66 percent among all our sample classified as a 
politically-connected sample (see Table 2).  It is also a fact that politically-connected boards are favored in 
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Indonesia according to mounting research of Indonesia’s political connections (Fisman, 2001; Habib, et al., 2017; 
Leux & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).. 
 
Table 2. Sample Distribution based on Military and Political Connection Types 
 
Panel A. Military Connection Sample Distribution Types (MCON) 
MCON Type 
Selected type MCON Other types MCON Total 
N % N % N % 
Military position 
Top officers (position) 20 71 8 29 28 100 
Middle officers (position) 4 4 27 96 28 100 
Low officers and others 
(position) 
7 25 21 75 28 100 
Military origin 
Army (Origin) 18 64 10 36 28 100 
Marine (Origin) 7 25 21 75 28 100 
Airforce (Origin) 0 0 28 100 28 100 
Police (Origin) 7 25 21 75 28 100 
Panel B. Political Connection Distribution Sample Types (PCON) 
PCON Type 
Selected type PCON Other type PCON Total 
N % N % N % 
Political board 
Board of Commissioner 78 96 2 4 80 100 
Board of Director 24 29 56 71 80 100 
Political affiliation 
People’s Consultative 
Assembly 
17 21 63 79 80 100 
House of Representatives 15 19 65 81 80 100 
Ministry 71 89 9 11 80 100 
Organization 47 59 33 41 80 100 
State-owned 47 59 33 41 80 100 
Political party 0 0 80 100 80 100 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
Interested in more types of military and political connection, we also classified our sample into more specific 
connections. Table 2 represents our sample with a more specific connection. We classify military connection into 
two classifications: based on military position and military origin (Panel A). There are three kinds of military 
positions which are a top officer (general), middle officer (major and colonel), and others. It shows that most of 
the military-connected boards have a high tier position with a former past military career. We also divide the 
military based on their origin. We add police origin as police (including Indonesian State Intelligence Agency 
personnel) as they mostly have the same traits as military personnel. 
 
As for the political connection, we also classify this into two: based on its board position and its political 
affiliation (Panel B). It shows that politically-connected listed companies are dominated by a Politically Exposed 
Person (PEP) who has a connection to certain ministry in Indonesia (89 percent).  
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Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3, as shown below. We construct three panels of descriptive statistics 
with panel A using all sample (N=110), while panel B only focuses on the difference between military-connected 
(N=28) and non-military-connected sample (N=82) also panel C focuses on both politically connected (N=73) and 
non-politically-connected sample (N=37). Both panel B and C show that CSRD in military and political 
connections have greater average value compared to non-military and non-politically-connected sample, 
respectively.   
 
Table 3. Statistic Descriptive 
 
Panel A. All Sample (N=110) 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
CSRD 0.401 0.357 0.099 0.956 
MCON 0.218 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PCON 0.664 1.000 0.000 1.000 
ROE 0.155 0.108 -0.406 1.358 
LEV 0.507 0.491 0.136 1.193 
FSIZE 30.701 30.771 28.453 32.744 
BSIZE 12.418 12.000 7.000 20.000 
INDCOM 0.342 0.333 0.000 0.750 
AUDCOM 3.300 3.000 0.000 6.000 
BIG4 0.800 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B. Military Connection (N=28) and Non-Military Connection Sample (N=82) 
Variable 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
MCON Non-MCON MCON Non-MCON MCON 
Non-
MCON 
MCON 
Non-
MCON 
CSRD 0.499 0.368 0.467 0.352 0.099 0.099 0.956 0.813 
MCON_POS 2.464 0.000 3.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 3.000 0.000 
MCON_ARMY 0.643 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
MCON_MARINE 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
MCON_POLICE 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON 0.929 0.659 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROE 0.134 0.162 0.129 0.092 -0.079 -0.406 0.330 1.358 
LEV 0.511 0.506 0.502 0.491 0.281 0.136 0.744 1.193 
FSIZE 30.924 30.627 30.843 30.771 29.859 28.453 32.045 32.744 
BSIZE 12.571 12.366 12.000 12.000 9.000 7.000 20.000 17.000 
INDCOM 0.348 0.339 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.750 
AUDCOM 3.393 3.268 3.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 6.000 
BIG4 0.607 0.866 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel C. Political Connection (N=73) and Non-Political Connection Sample (N=37) 
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Variable 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
PCON Non-PCON PCON Non-PCON PCON 
Non-
PCON 
PCON 
Non-
PCON 
CSRD 0.420 0.353 0.368 0.341 0.099 0.110 0.956 0.813 
MCON 0.325 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PCON_BOC 0.975 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_BOD 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_PCA 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_HOR 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_MINISTRY 0.887 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_ORG 0.588 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
PCON_STATE 0.588 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
ROE 0.137 0.202 0.107 0.144 -0.406 -0.069 1.358 1.358 
LEV 0.499 0.528 0.490 0.503 0.176 0.136 0.802 1.193 
FSIZE 30.843 30.327 30.838 30.447 28.799 28.453 32.744 32.487 
BSIZE 12.613 11.900 12.000 12.000 7.000 7.000 20.000 16.000 
INDCOM 0.336 0.357 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.600 
AUDCOM 3.413 3.000 3.000 3.000 2.000 0.000 6.000 5.000 
BIG4 0.825 0.733 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
3.2. Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) Model 
 
To test the effect of military and political connections on the Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD), 
we estimate the following model: 
 
CSRD i,t    =  β0  + β1 MCON i,t + β2 PCON i,t + β3 ROE i,t  + β4 LEV i,t  + β5 FSIZE i,t  + β6 BSIZE i,t  +   
  β7 INDCOM i,t  + β8 AUDCOM i,t  + β9 BIG4 i,t  + β10 YEAR i,t  + β11 INDUSTRY i,t  + ε i,t         (1) 
 
We employed those control variables based on prior literature (Chen, et al., 2019; Martínez-Ferrero, et al., 2016; 
McGuinness, et al., 2017; Ramón-Llorensa, et al., 2018; Wang, et al., 2018 we add return on equity, leverage, 
firm’s size, board of commissioners and directors, independent commissioners, audit committee, and firm’s public 
accounting firm. 
 
Table 4. Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition Data source 
Dependent variable   
CSRD Percentage of disclosed criteria in Sustainability Report (SR) SR 
Test variable   
MCON 
1 for a firm with one or more commissioners and/or directors who 
held military positions before sitting on the board and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
MCON_POS 
Military last position, 3 for top officers; 2 for middle officers; 1 for 
lower officers and others and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
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MCON_ARMY 1 for military origins is army (Angkatan Darat) and otherwise 0 ICMD 
MCON_MARINE 1 for military origins is marine (Angkatan Laut) and otherwise 0 ICMD 
MCON_AIRFORCE 1 for military origins is airforce (Angkatan Udara) and otherwise 0 ICMD 
MCON_POLICE 
1 for military origins is police and/or Indonesian State Intelligence 
Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional) and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON 
1 for a firm with one or more commissioners and/or directors who 
held political positions current/before sitting on the board and 
otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_BOC 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) is sitting on the Board of 
Commissioner and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_BOD 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) is sitting on the Board of 
Director and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_PAC 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from People’s 
Consultative Assembly and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_HOR 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from House of 
Representatives and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_MINISTRY 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from Indonesia’s 
Ministry and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_ORG 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from important 
organizations and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
PCON_STATE 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from state-owned 
companies or Pemerintah Republik Indonesia (Indonesia’s 
government) ownership minimum 10% of total firm ownership and 
otherwise 0  
ICMD 
PCON_PARTY 
1 for Political Exposed Person (PEP) affiliation from a political party 
and otherwise 0 
ICMD 
Control variable   
ROE Net income after preferred divided by average total assets for the year OSIRIS 
LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets OSIRIS 
FSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets OSIRIS 
BSIZE The total person who sits on the boards ICMD 
INDCOM The total person who positioned as an independent commissioner AR 
AUDCOM The total person who sits on the audit committee AR 
BIG4 
1 for firm’s Public Accountant Firm (PAF) is either Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young (EY), KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and 
otherwise 0 
OSIRIS 
MILLS The inverse Mills ratio  
Selection model variable   
MDIST Natural logarithm of the distance between the location of an 
Indonesian Military base and the firm’s headquarters 
Mapdevelopers.com 
Source: Constructed by authors 
 
We provide operational variable measurement in Table 4. The data source of this research sample comes from 
Sustainability Report (SR), Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD), OSIRIS database, Annual Report (AR) 
and map developer website. As mentioned before, we divide the military and political connection into a specific 
connection. We also derive other OLS to test the specific effect of each military connection and political 
connection on the CSRD. The estimated model for the specific connection types is: 
 
CSRD i,t    =  β0  + β1 X1 i,t  + β2 ROE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 FSIZE i,t  + β5 BSIZE i,t  + β6 INDCOM i,t  +   
  β7 AUDCOM i,t  + β8 BIG4 i,t  + β9 YEAR i,t  + β10 INDUSTRY i,t  + ε i,t           (2) 
 
CSRD i,t    =  β0  + β1 X2 i,t  + β2 ROE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 FSIZE i,t  + β5 BSIZE i,t  + β6 INDCOM i,t  +   
  β7 AUDCOM i,t  + β8 BIG4 i,t  + β9 YEAR i,t  + β10 INDUSTRY i,t  + ε i,t           (3) 
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X1 = Specific military connection types. It can be either military position or military origins (army, marine, 
police) 
X2 = Specific political connection types. It can be either political board (board of commissioner, the board of 
director) or political affiliation (people’s consultative assembly, house of representatives, organization, ministry, 
state, political party). 
 
Table 5. Pearson Correlation Matrix (N=110) 
 
 CSRD MCON PCON ROE LEV FSIZE BSIZE INDCOM AUDCOM BIG4 
CSRD 1.000          
           
MCON 0.366*** 1.000         
 (0.000)          
PCON 0.018 0.376*** 1.000        
 (0.856) (0.000)         
ROE -0.103 -0.039 -0.043 1.000       
 (0.286) (0.683) (0.653)        
LEV -0.137 -0.071 0.105 0.082 1.000      
 (0.153) (0.459) (0.275) (0.393)       
FSIZE 0.239** 0.161* 0.228** -0.192** -0.046 1.000     
 (0.012) (0.094) (0.017) (0.045) (0.631)      
BSIZE 0.310*** 0.062 0.059 0.039 -0.107 0.365*** 1.000    
 (0.001) (0.521) (0.543) (0.683) (0.264) (0.000)     
INDCOM 0.209** 0.044 -0.074 -0.391*** -0.136 0.133 -0.100 1.000   
 (0.029) (0.648) (0.443) (0.000) (0.156) (0.165) (0.298)    
AUDCOM 0.022 -0.095 0.181* -0.045 -0.035 0.296*** 0.045 -0.041 1.000  
 (0.820) (0.321) (0.059) (0.644) (0.718) (0.002) (0.640) (0.671)   
BIG4 -0.069 -0.121 -0.067 0.141 -0.489*** 0.099 -0.062 -0.094 0.038 1.000 
 (0.474) (0.208) (0.485) (0.143) (0.000) (0.304) (0.520) (0.328) (0.697)  
Source: Computed by authors 
 
Table 5 provides a correlation matrix for all variables used in the main analyses. The relationship between MCON 
and CSRD is positive. We also found military connections are positively associated with the relationship between 
CSR and PCON variable is positive but not significant. This gives the picture that a company that has a member 
of the Board of Commissioners and/or Directors of connected politics will have no result on CSRD of the 
company. We also employ univariate test of our research variable. Table 6 displays the results of the t-test, which 
explains that the average value of the CSR performance of companies that have military connections is higher 
compared to companies that are not connected to the military, while the company connected politics has an 
average value of a company's CSRD higher than a company that without political connections. 
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Table 6. Independent T-test Result 
 
Panel A. Military Connection Independent t-test (MCON) 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
Coef t-value 
MCON (N=24) 
NON-MCON 
(N=86) 
CSRD 0.543 0.362 0.180*** 4.093*** 
ROE 0.132 0.161 -0.028 -0.410 
LEV 0.482 0.514 -0.033 -0.744 
FSIZE 30.985 30.622 0.363* 1.690* 
BSIZE 12.667 12.349 0.318 0.643 
INDCOM 0.352 0.339 0.013 0.458 
AUDCOM 3.125 3.349 -0.224 -0.997 
BIG4 0.708 0.826 -0.117 -1.267 
Panel B. Political Connection Independent t-test (PCON) 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
Coef t-value 
PCON (N=73) NON-PCON (N=37) 
CSRD 0.404 0.396 0.008 0.182 
ROE 0.145 0.173 -0.027 -0.451 
LEV 0.522 0.479 0.042 1.098 
FSIZE 30.853 30.402 0.451** 2.435** 
BSIZE 12.507 12.243 0.264 0.610 
INDCOM 0.335 0.355 -0.019 -0.770 
AUDCOM 3.425 3.054 0.371* 1.911* 
BIG4 0.781 0.838 -0.057 -0.701 
t statistics in parentheses 
* t > 1,660 **t > 1,984 ***t > 2,626, in level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we reported the empirical result of research analysis on the relationship of military and political 
connection to Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD). In the first section, we provide the result of the 
OLS regression of the main research model. Next, we present the OLS regression for each relation of specific 
military and political connection to CSRD. Last but not least, we described the result of Heckman’s two-stage 
regression model to deal with the military connection endogeneity problem. 
 
4.1. Main Analysis 
 
We provide our main analysis in Table 7. First, we decide to make the OLS regression model without any test 
variables (column 1) to find the adjusted R2 value before considering any test variables in the research model. In 
the second and third column, we provide each test variables (e.g. military connection and political connection), 
respectively. We found that military connection (MCON) has a positive coefficient (0.111) and is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (t=2.09). We also documented that the adjusted R2 value is increasing compared 
to first research model (column 1). Based on the third column, political connection (PCON) has no significant 
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correlation (t=0.94) on CSRD. We also employ both test variables into one research model and find MCON still 
has positive coefficient (0.108) and significant correlation (t=1.99), which implies that the result is robust in any 
model, with or without PCON in the research model. We also conduct the regression model where we make the 
interaction between MCON and PCON, but it shows no significant result. 
 
Table 7. Military Connection, Political Connection and CSRD OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD 
MCON  0.111**  0.108** 
  (2.09)  (1.99) 
PCON   0.033 0.016 
   (0.94) (0.46) 
ROE -0.118 -0.110 -0.107 -0.105 
 (-1.44) (-1.34) (-1.27) (-1.25) 
LEV -0.042 -0.023 -0.049 -0.027 
 (-0.44) (-0.23) (-0.52) (-0.27) 
FSIZE 0.050** 0.039* 0.048** 0.039* 
 (2.53) (1.96) (2.34) (1.89) 
BSIZE 0.020** 0.020** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (2.42) (2.29) (2.28) (2.20) 
INDCOM 0.347** 0.353** 0.366** 0.362** 
 (2.43) (2.43) (2.56) (2.47) 
AUDCOM -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
 (-0.26) (-0.51) (-0.47) (-0.60) 
BIG4 0.070 0.116* 0.065 0.112* 
 (1.27) (1.90) (1.16) (1.81) 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
_cons -1.361** -1.077* -1.294** -1.053* 
 (-2.42) (-1.89) (-2.19) (-1.80) 
Adjusted r2 0.361 0.391 0.358 0.385 
F 14.283 13.617 11.928 12.341 
N 110 110 110 110 
t statistics in parentheses 
* t > 1,660 **t > 1,984 ***t > 2,626, in level 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
As MCON showing shows a positive correlation with CSRD, we infer that our first hypothesis is accepted while 
our second test variable, PCON, shows a different result. We expect that that result comes from the information 
disclosure of politically-connected firms as being lower compared to other firms. One of the reasons is that 
tendencies are politically-connected firms protect the benefits acquired from the political connection (Chaney, et 
al., 2011). Another possible reason is that the politically-connected board(s) will prioritize personal matter over 
firm interest (Bencheikh & Taktak, 2017). 
 
4.2. Specific Military Connection Types Analysis 
 
In this section, we provide deeper analysis which specifies military connection types. As shown in Table 8, we 
employ four additional specific military connection types (e.g. position, army, marine, and police). We omit the 
air force military origins as our sample did not consist of any air force military connection origins. The first 
column shows that the higher position of military career has a positive coefficient (0.041) and significant 
correlation (t=2.16). Consistent with the military position, army and marine military connection are shown to be 
positive and statistically significant at level 1% and 5%, respectively. The different result comes from a military 
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connection that comes from police origin, it shows negative (-0.228) correlation at a 1% level of significance (t=-
3.24) with CSRD. These results also imply that the army and marine military origin correlations towards CSRD 
are stronger than police correlation as the aggregate military connection shows a positive correlation (Table 7). 
 
Table 8. Military Connection, Political Connection and CSRD OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD 
MCON_POS 0.041**    
 (2.16)    
MCON_ARMY  0.153***   
  (2.65)   
MCON_MARINE   0.200**  
   (2.16)  
MCON_POLICE    -0.228*** 
    (-3.24) 
ROE -0.097 -0.091 -0.121 -0.091 
 (-1.21) (-1.18) (-1.44) (-1.19) 
LEV -0.008 -0.002 -0.054 -0.041 
 (-0.08) (-0.02) (-0.57) (-0.45) 
FSIZE 0.036* 0.034* 0.053** 0.057*** 
 (1.77) (1.80) (2.62) (3.15) 
BSIZE 0.021** 0.022** 0.022** 0.023*** 
 (2.45) (2.56) (2.49) (2.88) 
INDCOM 0.364** 0.339** 0.345** 0.311** 
 (2.54) (2.35) (2.33) (2.23) 
AUDCOM -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.007 
 (-0.18) (0.09) (-0.23) (0.53) 
BIG4 0.102* 0.093* 0.060 0.000 
 (1.84) (1.81) (1.12) (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
_cons -0.986* -0.973* -1.456** -1.616*** 
 (-1.74) (-1.82) (-2.54) (-3.08) 
Adjusted r2 0.395 0.422 0.409 0.406 
F 13.922 14.440 14.524 16.187 
N 110 110 110 110 
t statistics in parentheses 
* t > 1,660 **t > 1,984 ***t > 2,626, in level 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
The military position is closely related to the number of responsibilities. A higher tier officer has more mounting 
responsibilities than their junior subordinates. This provides a basic understanding of the positive correlation 
between military position and CSRD. As for military origin, army and marine have been trained to possess Esprit 
De Corps and sensitivity to others, which means they feel responsible to help others in the form of corporate CSR. 
The negative correlation of police origins may come from the fact that police origin is dominated by the Indonesia 
State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional), in which, although their organizational ultimate goal is to 
help others, most of their operations are conducted in secretly. They are not used to sharing information as most 
of the organizational activities are classified. 
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4.3. Specific Political Connection Types Analysis 
 
As we conducted with a military connection, we are also interested to further analyze the correlation of specific 
political connection types towards CSRD. Table 9 provides the result of specific political connection types. 
Among all specific political connection types only People’s Consultative Assembly (MCON_PCA) and House of 
Representative (MCON_HOR) affiliation shows significant correlation towards CSRD. The coefficient 
MCON_PCA is 0.093 and MCON_HOR is 0.119 exposed 10% (t=1.67) and 1% (t=2.67) level of significance.  
 
Table 9. Specific Political Connection OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD CSRD 
PCON_BOC 0.048       
 (1.34)       
PCON_BOD  -0.077      
  (-1.38)      
PCON_PCA   0.093*     
   (1.67)     
PCON_HOR    0.119***    
    (2.67)    
PCON_MINISTRY     0.017   
     (0.45)   
PCON_ORG      0.016  
      (0.48)  
PCON_STATE       -0.000 
       (-0.01) 
ROE -0.106 -0.141* -0.106 -0.077 -0.115 -0.120 -0.118 
 (-1.27) (-1.80) (-1.25) (-0.99) (-1.40) (-1.43) (-1.43) 
LEV -0.040 -0.000 -0.049 -0.040 -0.052 -0.031 -0.042 
 (-0.43) (-0.00) (-0.52) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.33) (-0.44) 
FSIZE 0.048** 0.050** 0.043** 0.045** 0.047** 0.049** 0.050** 
 (2.40) (2.57) (2.26) (2.36) (2.09) (2.48) (2.42) 
BSIZE 0.018** 0.020** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (2.13) (2.51) (2.27) (3.01) (2.35) (2.36) (2.40) 
INDCOM 0.365** 0.331** 0.327** 0.399*** 0.349** 0.344** 0.347** 
 (2.59) (2.38) (2.16) (2.83) (2.44) (2.40) (2.39) 
AUDCOM -0.009 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.66) (-0.22) (-0.70) (-0.48) (-0.41) (-0.36) (-0.24) 
BIG4 0.069 0.065 0.060 0.060 0.067 0.069 0.070 
 (1.22) (1.26) (1.15) (1.15) (1.22) (1.26) (1.26) 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
cons -1.302** -1.358** -1.111** -1.332** -1.262* -1.343** -1.363** 
 (-2.24) (-2.43) (-2.02) (-2.42) (-1.90) (-2.36) (-2.28) 
Adjusted r2 0.364 0.374 0.379 0.395 0.355 0.355 0.354 
F 11.407 16.708 14.218 15.979 12.791 12.928 13.368 
N 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
t statistics in parentheses 
* t > 1,660 **t > 1,984 ***t > 2,626, in level 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Computed by authors 
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The underlying reason behind those results is that both PCA and HOR are Indonesia’s government bodies entitled 
to devise national regulations, including regulation related to CSR activities or its disclosure. It means PCA and 
HOR politically connected firms have a longer time to adjust to new regulations as, mostly, the firm will be 
informed long before those regulations are published. 
 
4.4. Self-selection Bias 
 
Self-selection bias is a bias that is introduced into a research project when participants choose whether or not to 
participate in the project, and the group that chooses to participate is not equivalent (in terms of the research 
criteria) to the group that opts out.  The problem of selection bias in economic and social statistics and arises 
when a rule other than simple random sampling is used to sample the underlying population that is the object of 
interest (Heckman, 2010). According to Harymawan (2018), there are possibilities where unobserved military 
connection traits are the antecedents rather than military connections.  In order to deal with this issue, we employ 
Heckman’s two-stage model following Kim and Zhang (2016). 
 
In the first stage of regression, we used military base distance (MDIST) as our selection model variable to ensure 
that the CSRD is correlated with the military connection, not the military base distance. Hereby, we estimate the 
following first stage regression model is as follows: 
 
MCON i,t    =  β0  + β1 MDIST i,t  + β2 ROE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 FSIZE i,t  + β5 BSIZE i,t  + β6 INDCOM i,t  +  
  β7 AUDCOM i,t  + β8 BIG4 i,t  + β9 YEAR i,t  + β10 INDUSTRY i,t  + ε i,t           (4) 
 
The exclusion variable in this research is MDIST, which is closely related to MCON. We believe that MDIST has 
no direct relationship to CSRD other than indirect impact through MCON. According to prior research 
(Harymawan, 2018; Kim & Zhang, 2016), closer distance from firm headquarter office and military base will 
result in more chance of having military-connected board(s), at the same time that distance will have no 
explanation towards CSRD. 
 
In order to examine the correlation between military connection and CSRD, we estimated the following second-
level regression equation: 
 
CSRD i,t    =  β0  + β1 MCON i,t  + β2 PCON i,t  + β3 ROE i,t  + β4 LEV i,t  + β5 FSIZE i,t  + β6 BSIZE i,t  +  
  β7 INDCOM i,t  + β8 AUDCOM i,t  + β9 BIG4 i,t  + β10 INVMILLS i,t  + β11 YEAR i,t  +   
  β1 INDUSTRY i,t  + ε i,t                 (5) 
 
Using the estimation result of the first-level regression equation, we constructed Mills ratios and included these 
ratios in the second-stage regression (INVMILLS). The β1 is expected to have positive and significant to indicate 
that military-connected board(s) will be favorable in terms of improving the CSRD. 
 
Table 10. Heckman Two-Stage Regression 
 
 1st Stage Regression 2st Stage Regression 
 MCON CSRD CSRD 
MCON  0.101* 0.099* 
  (1.69) (1.66) 
PCON   0.014 
   (0.38) 
MDIST 5.317***   
 (4.25)   
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ROE 0.072 -0.111 -0.106 
 (0.17) (-1.33) (-1.26) 
LEV -0.359 -0.012 -0.017 
 (-0.46) (-0.11) (-0.16) 
FSIZE 0.613*** 0.032 0.033 
 (2.61) (1.10) (1.11) 
BSIZE -0.091 0.022** 0.021* 
 (-1.22) (2.00) (1.84) 
INDCOM -1.008 0.371** 0.376** 
 (-0.90) (2.48) (2.50) 
AUDCOM -0.166 -0.007 -0.008 
 (-1.16) (-0.49) (-0.57) 
BIG4 -1.551*** 0.130* 0.125 
 (-3.45) (1.75) (1.61) 
INVMILLS  -0.016 -0.013 
  (-0.35) (-0.28) 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
_cons -28.303*** -0.876 -0.890 
 (-3.50) (-1.07) (-1.08) 
Pseudo r2 0.301   
Adjusted r2  0.385 0.379 
F  13.020 11.897 
N 110 110 110 
t statistics in parentheses 
* t > 1,660 **t > 1,984 ***t > 2,626, in level 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
Table 10 presents the result of Heckman’s two-stage regression. The first column shows the result of the first-
stage regression model. It shows that military distance has positive (5.317) and significant correlation at 1% 
(t=4.25). The second and third column in Table 10 is the result of second-stage regression where the dependent is 
CSRD not MCON as in the first-stage regression. In the third column, we add PCON in the research model to 
provide a more robust result. This second-stage regression result implies that the correlation MCON toward 
CSRD is robust whether in ordinary OLS model (Table 8) or Heckman’s two-stage regression model (Table 10). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Based on the test results of the analysis performed over the variables examined, the conclusions that can be 
drawn from this study are as follows. Military connection has positive and significant effect against CSR, 
meaning the company having a member of the Board of Commissioners or Directors of the experienced military 
can generate CSR better than companies that do not have a Member the Board of Commissioners or Directors 
who are military experienced. This is because members of the military are known as the soul of good leadership, 
discipline, and also the ability of good organizing (Harymawan, 2018) ,as well as having influence in 
management decision-making (Benmelech & Frydman, 2015), considered to be able to improve performance as 
well as the CSRD of company.  However, political connections have a negative and not significant relationship 
towards CSR. This is due to the possibility of an indication that members of the Board of Commissioners or 
Directors of connected politics would sacrifice the interests of the company for the sake of objective political 
connections for personal gain (Bencheikh & Taktak, 2017), so that attention to managing your company's 
information disclosure quality will be low in order to protect the benefits obtained on gains from political 
connections (Chaney, et al., 2011). For further studies we recommend that to add more proxy of CSR such as 
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KLD (Simpson & Sariol, 2018), CSR advertising expense (Oh, et al., 2017) or other CSRD criteria to provide 
more robust result of military connection and CSR correlation.                       
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